

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 05895 061952Z

43

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/031 W

----- 048082

P 061900Z NOV 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2175

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 5895

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS:O POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS,

NOVEMBER 6, 1973 (SALT TWO -340)

1. SUMMARY. POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS CENTERED FOR MOST PART ON THROW-WEIGHT ISSUE AND INCLUDED EXCHANGES ON SLBM LAUNCHER NUMBERS AND NEW SILO CONSTRUCTION. END SUMMARY.

2. THROW-WEIGHT. WHEN SHCHUKIN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN RE APPLICABILITY OF THROW-WEIGHT TO SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS (A-443), NITZE POINTED OUT THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD CAREFULLY PHRASED HIS STATEMENT IN TERMS OF THROW-WEIGHT AS A MEASURE OF MISSILE BOOSTER CAPABILITY. HE HAD DESCRIBED A CONCEPT AND HAD NOT RELATED IT TO SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS. SHCHUKIN SAID HE THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO HAVE ALL OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS BROUGHT TOGETHER IN A SINGLE FORMAL STATEMENT.

3. IN RESPONSE TO SHCHUKIN'S OBSERVATION THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD REFERRED ONLY TO ICBM THROW-WEIGHT AND HAD NOT MENTIONED SLBM THROW-WEIGHT, NITZE SAID THAT THE U. S. POSITION CALLED FOR LIMITATIONS ONLY ON ICBM THROW-WEIGHT. NITZE RECALLED THEIR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION ON SLBM THROW-WEIGHT,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 05895 061952Z

WHEN HE HAD POINTED OUT THE GREATER DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING

HIGH ACCURACY WITH SLBMS THAN WITH ICBMS, AND THE GREATER DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF ICBMS THAN SLBMS.

4. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IF ONE WERE STARTING FROM A ZERO SITUATION WHERE NEITHER SIDE HAD ICBMS, HE THOUGHT THAT THE IDEA OF LIMITING ICBM THROW-WEIGHT WOULD HAVE UTILITY. BUT ICBMS OF LARGE THROW-WEIGHT EXISTED, AND HE DID NOT THINK IT WAS PRACTICABLE NOW TO CHANGE THAT SITUATION.

5. WHEN SHCHUKIN RAISED THE CONCEPT OF THROW-WEIGHT IN CONNECTION WITH STRATEGIC BOMBERS, NITZE REPLIED THAT THE TERM "THROW-WEIGHT" WAS ONLY APPLICABLE TO MISSILES AND NOT TO BOMBERS. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME CONCEPT WHICH COULD BE COMPARABLE TO ICBM THROW-WEIGHT SUCH AS THE USEFUL WEIGHT WHICH COULD BE LAUNCHED BY A BOMBER. NITZE POINTED OUT THE NATURE OF THE DEFENSES WHICH A BOMBER WOULD HAVE TO PENETRATE AND THAT THERE WAS NO EASY OR LOGICAL WAY OF ARRIVING AT A CONCEPT FOR STRATEGIC BOMBERS COMPARABLE TO MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT.

6. IN RESPONSE TO TRUSOV'S QUESTION WHY U. S. HAD PROPOSED EQUAL LIMITS ON AGGREGATE ICBM THROW-WEIGHT, BUT HAD NOT INCLUDED BOMBER THROW-WEIGHT (A-440). TOWNY POINTED OUT THAT ICBMS WERE THE MOST POWERFUL AND MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS IN THE TWO SIDES' ARSENALS. AS FOR BOMBERS, TOWNY SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE APPARENTLY DID NOT ENVISAGE ANY LIMITS ON SOVIET AIR DEFENSES AND THAT DELIVERABLE BOMBER PAYLOAD IN A UNCONSTRAINED AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT HAD NO MEANING.

7. SLBM LAUNCHERS. KLOSSON (A-441) ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SLBM LAUNCHERS PERMITTED EACH SIDE UNDER SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE III. GRINEVSKY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND BOTH SETS OF NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THE, IA PROTOCOL.

8. NEW SILO CONSTRUCTION. WHEN FITZGERALD (A-446) NOTED THAT SOVIET SIDE STILL HAD NOT EXPLAINED WHETHER SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE III WOULD PERMIT SILO RELOCATION OR NEW CONSTRUCTION OF SILOS, TRUSOV SAID THAT ANSWER TO THE U. S. QUESTION WAS IN ARTICLE III AND IN SEMENOV'S STATEMENT THAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 05895 061952Z

PERMANENT AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT PERMIT BUILDUP IN NUMBERS OF FIXED LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS. TRUSOV ALSO SAID THE QUESTION OF NEW SILOS COULD BE DECIDED ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS AND THAT A U. S. COUNTER PROPOSAL WOULD BE THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION.

9. (RANGE LIMITS ON SLBMS AND ASMS. AT NOV. 5 SCC MEETING, MAZERKIN, IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION (A-445), SAID

SOVIET 600 KILOMETER RANGE LIMIT ON SLBMS WAS SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION AND FINAL AGREEMENT. MAZERKIN SAID THE SOVIETS HAD SELECTED THE FIGURE PRIMARILY OUT OF ASW CONSIDERATIONS, SINCE THE SOVIET NAVY COULD CONTROL OPERATIONS OF U. S. SUBMARINES WITHIN 600 KILOMETERS OF SOVIET COASTLINES. HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALSO RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THE U. S. ARGUMENT THAT SLCMS, ALTHOUGH TACTICAL IN NATURE AND DESIGNED TO ATTACK SHIPS, COULD BE STRATEGIC AND THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS CANNOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SLCMS DESIGNED TO STRIKE LAND TARGETS AND THOSE DESIGNED TO STRIKE ONLY SURFACE SHIPS. HE ALSO SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CONCLUDED THAT SLCMS WITH RANGES COMPARABLE TO PRESENTLY DEPLOYED SOVIET "TACTICAL" SLBMS SHOULD BE CATEGORIZED AS "TACTICAL MISSILES AND PUT BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS. MAZERKIN SAID THE 600 KILOMETER RANGE WOULD NOT IMPINGE ON PRESENT SOVIET SLCMS, WHOSE RANGE ARE LESS THAN 600 KILOMETERS AND HE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD NOT IMPINGE UPON PRESENT U. S. SLCMS SUCH AS THE HARPOON.)

10. (AS FOR DOWNWARD NEGOTIATION OF 600 FIGURE, MAZERKIN SAID (A-445) FIGURE, IF U. S. WANTED TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL, COULD BE 400 KILOMETERS. IN HIS VIEW, HOWEVER, THIS FIGURE MIGHT NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POSSIBLE SLCM DEVELOPMENTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND NATIONAL MEANS MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A 400 KILOMETER SLCM AND ONE OF A GREATER RANGE. RE UPWARD NEGOTIATION OF FIGURE, MAZERKIN SAID THAT SOMETHING MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, BUT NOT AS HIGH AS 1,000 KILOMETERS, MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. HE SAID THE 1,000 KILOMETER RANGE RAISES ASW PROBLEMS, AND IT ALSO PLACES SLCM IN STRATEGIC MISSILE CLASS.)

1. (AS FOR ASM RANGES, MAZERKIN SAID (TO FITZGERALD, A-445) THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SPECIFIED A MAXIMUM ASM RANGE OF LESS THAN 1,000 KILOMETERS. FITZGERALD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 05895 061952Z

POINTED OUT THAT THE U. S. HAD PROPOSED A 3,00 ASM RANGE, BUT MAZERKIN INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT CONSIDER A RANGE OF 1,000 KILOMETERS AS ACCEPTABLE. WHEN MAZERKIN ASKED FITZGERALD WHY U. S. DESIRED A 1,000 KILOMETER ASM, FITZGERALD POINTED TO U. S. CONCERNS RE SURVIVABILITY OF DETERRENT SYSTEMS AND THEIR ABILITY TO PENETRATE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES. MAZERKIN NOTED THAT SOVIET AIR DEFENSES WERE EFFECTIVE ONLY AGAINST BOMBERS AND SOVIET SIDE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT U. S. PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT THE U. S. TO DEVELOP ANOTHER WEAPON WHICH COULD STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY.)

JOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: martinjw
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT05895
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731151/aaaablbi.tel
Line Count: 165
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: martinjw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 FEB 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <31-Jan-2002 by boyleja, RDFRD, REFER TO DOE>; RELEASED <19 FEB 2002 by martinjw>; APPROVED <20 FEB 2002 by martinjw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HIGHLIGHTS:O POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, NOVEMBER 6, 1973 (SALT TWO -340)
TAGS: PARM
To: SECSTATE WASHDC WASHDC
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005